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Abstract
We develop a simple model with heterogeneous agents and search
frictions to study how increases in matching intensity between buyers
and sellers determine the level of income inequality among sellers. Our
ndings indicate that a reduction in search frictions leads to higher
inequality and induces buyers to purchase goods and services only from
specialized sellers.
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1 Introduction
The impact of technological change on income inequality is well-documented in
the literature (Acemoglu, 2002). Technological advances increase the demand
for skilled labor leading to a widening of the wage gap between skilled and
unskilled workers (Acemoglu, 1998; Card and Dinardo, 2002). Moreover, the
reduction of the power of low-skilled workers due to closer monitoring of their
e¤ort, triggered by adoption of new technologies, (Skott and Guy, 2007) and
Department of Economics, University of Piraeus, 80 Karaoli & Dimitriou Street, Piraeus
185 34, Greece. E-mail: mpolemis@unipi.gr (Polemis); kostasel@otenet.gr (Eleftheriou).
yCorresponding author. Tel: +30 210 4142282; Fax: +30 210 4142346.
1
the so-called generalpurpose technology (Aghion et al., 2002) -as expressed
by skill transferability and vintage capital compatibility- can lead to higher
inequality. In the current paper, the e¤ect of technology on income inequality
is examined within a di¤erent context; we utilize a simple matching model to
study how increases in matching intensity between buyers and sellers1 a¤ects
income inequality among sellers.
Our ndings indicate that a reduction in frictions due to technological ad-
vancements leads to equilibrium outcomes where buyers purchase goods and
services only from specialized sellers. In this case, income inequality is high.
In contrast, when frictions are high, nding a specialized seller is more di¢ -
cult leading to matches with non-specialized sellers and hence a less polarized
distribution of sellersearnings. Our results are consistent with the ndings of
Brynjolfsson et al. (2016). In this study, a positive trend in income inequality
among professional sellers in eBay is identied. Furthermore, Brynjolfsson et
al. (2016) conclude that growth is experienced most likely by sellers providing
specialized o¤erings. The rest of the paper is structured as follows. The next
Section presents the model while Section 3 discusses market equilibria. Our
main results are presented in Section 4. Finally, Section 5 concludes the paper.
2 The Model
2.1 Environment
We consider a market for a service. The market comprises of a large number
(normalized to one) of buyers and the same number of sellers who live in
1These increases can be translated into reductions in search frictions enabling buyers to
nd the seller meeting their needs best. Decreases in frictions may be caused by develop-
ments in information technology (e.g., development of e-commerce).
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continuous time. Buyers and sellers are of two types; h and w.2 The proportion
of h-type buyers and h-type sellers is  and , respectively (where 0 ;   1).
Sellers and buyers meet each other at a Poisson arrival rate  (see Mortensen,
1986). The utility that buyers get from the service they receive from sellers is
u. Seller i has cost (disutility of work) zero for i job, i = h;w, where seller i
has cost c 2 (0; u] for not i job. As soon as they match, agents bargain over the
price through a Nash bargaining process (we assume 50=50 bargaining power).
When agents of di¤erent type meet, then the match will form if the value of c
is small enough and more precisely if it is below a threshold value (reservation
value). We assume that all participants are risk neutral discounting the future
at the same rate r. Buyers leave the market after trading and they are replaced
by identical ones (clones). Sellers are innite lived and stay in the market
forever.
2.2 Exchange
The price that sellers charge buyers will be
pij = argmax
pij
[u  pij   V bj ]
1
2 [pij   c] 12 (1)
where i; j = h;w. The rst subscript denotes the type of seller and the second
the type of buyer. Hence pij is the price charged by i seller to j buyer. V bj
represents the value of being a j type buyer. The outside options are the
continuation values. Solving (1) we get
pij =
1
2
[u+ c  V bj ] (2)
2h (w) type buyers demand sellers for h (w) type jobs. h (w) type sellers are specialized
in h (w) type jobs.
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where c = 0 if i = j, and c 2 (0; u] if i 6= j.
3 Market Equilibria
Equilibria are patterns of trading from which no one wants to deviate. Hence
our objective, is to identify candidate equilibrium patterns of trade and nd
the portions of the parameter space for which they are self-sustaining.
In type 1 equilibrium pattern all agents trade with each other. Let V tni
be the value3 of being a group t individual of type i when everyone behaves
according to type n trading pattern.4
In the case of type 1 equilibrium pattern we have that
rV b1h = [(u  phh) + (1  )(u   pwh)  V b1h ] (3a)
rV b1w = [(u  phw) + (1  )(u  pww)  V b1w ] (3b)
rV s1h = [phh + (1  )(phw   c)] (3c)
rV s1w = [(pwh   c) + (1  )pww] (3d)
By substituting pijs and doing the algebra we get
(r +

2
)V b1h = [(u=2) + (1  )(u  c)=2] (4a)
(r +

2
)V b1w = [(u  c)=2 + (1  )u=2] (4b)
3where t = buyer (b), seller (s).
4Alternatively, V tni is the discounted expected value of a group t individual of type i
under n equilibrium trading pattern.
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rV s1h = [

2
(u  V b1h ) +
(1  )
2
(u  c  V b1w )] (4c)
rV s1w = [

2
(u  c  V b1h ) +
(1  )
2
(u  V b1w )] (4d)
In order to nd the portions of the parameter space which ensure the exis-
tence of type 1 equilibrium, we have to consider whether an individual of any
type and group may want to deviate from the above dened trading pattern.
Firstly, we ensure that participation in the market is worthwhile. Hence, we get
the following participation (rationality) constraints; V b1h ; V
b1
w ; V
s1
h and V
s1
w  0
(solution of (3a)-(3d) should satisfy the rationality constraints). Therefore,
trading with agents of di¤erent type is worthwhile only if the value of trad-
ing (and re-entering the market5) exceeds that of keep searching for a trading
partner. In other words, we get the following
u  pwh  V b1h ; u  phw  V b1w ; pwh + V s1h   c  V s1h ; phw + V s1w   c  V s1w
Hence the relevant incentive compatible constraints are
u  pwh  V b1h ; u  phw  V b1w ; pwh   c  0; phw   c  0 (5)
By substituting the relevant values for pijs from (2) and doing some algebra,
we get that the above constraints are satised if the following conditions hold.
1
2
[u  c  V b1h ]  0 (6)
and
5This holds for sellers.
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12
[u  c  V b1w ]  0 (7)
It can be easily shown that if (6) and (7) are satised then the trade with
agents of the same type is worthwhile as well. By substituting (4a) and (4b)
into (6) and (7), respectively and solving with respect to c we get the following
reservation values:
~ch() = u[1=(1 + )] (8)
where  = =2r and
~cw() = u[1=(1 + )] (9)
where  = (1  )=2r.
If c exceeds the above reservation values then type 1 trading pattern is no
longer an equilibrium since there is an incentive for deviation. If the proportion
of h-type sellers is greater than 1=2 then ~cw > ~ch and therefore type 1 trading
pattern is an equilibrium if c  ~ch. Doing the same for  = 1=2 and  < 1=2
and summarizing all the above results we get the following proposition.
Proposition 1. Type 1 trading pattern is an equilibrium if c  ~ch() for
 > 1=2; c  ~cw() for  < 1=2; c  ~c = ~cw() = ~ch() for  = 1=2, given ; r.
In type 2 equilibrium pattern h-type buyers do not trade with w-type
sellers (but w-type buyers trade with h-type sellers). The relevant equations
for buyers and sellers will be
(r + =2)V b2h = (u=2) (10a)
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(r +

2
)V b2w = [(u  c)=2 + (1  )u=2] (10b)
rV s2h = 

2
(u  V b2h ) (10c)
rV s2w = [

2
(u  c  V b2h ) +
(1  )
2
(u  V b2w )] (10d)
Given the above equations and Proposition 1, we get
Proposition 2. Type 2 trading pattern is an equilibrium if ~cw  c > ~ch and
 > 1=2, given ; r.
In type 3 trading pattern w-type buyers do not trade with h-type sell-
ers (but h-type buyers trade with w-sellers). The relevant equation for each
individual is
(r +

2
)V b3h = [(u=2) + (1  )(u  c)=2] (11a)
[r + (1  )=2]V b3w = (1  )u=2 (11b)
rV s3h = [

2
(u  V b3h ) +
(1  )
2
(u  c  V b3w )] (11c)
rV s3w = 
(1  )
2
(u  V b3w ) (11d)
Following the same logic, we get
Proposition 3. Type 3 trading pattern is an equilibrium if ~ch  c > ~cw and
 < 1=2, given ; r.
In type 4 equilibrium buyers of type i do not trade with sellers of type j.
The relevant equations are
(r + =2)V b4h = (u=2) (12a)
[r + (1  )=2]V b4w = (1  )u=2 (12b)
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rV s4h = 

2
(u  V b4h ) (12c)
rV s4w = 
(1  )
2
(u  V b4w ) (12d)
Proposition 4. Type 4 trading pattern is an equilibrium if c > ~cw for  > 1=2;
c > ~ch for  < 1=2; c > ~c = ~cw = ~ch for  = 1=2, given ; r:
Finally, when c = ~ch or c = ~cw there is a continuum of mixed strategy
equilibria. In such cases, we assume that all individuals (weakly) prefer to
stick to the trading pattern specied each time.
4 Matching rate and income di¤erentials
Figure 1 graphs ~cw and ~ch against . The regions marked 1, 2, 3 and 4 cor-
respond to the values of c and  for which the unique equilibrium trading
patterns are respectively Type 1 (every meeting generates transactions), Type
2 (h-type equilibrium),Type 3 (w-type equilibrium) and Type 4 (i type buy-
ers do not trade with j type sellers). Moreover ~ch() is decreasing and convex,
~cw() is increasing and convex, ~ch(1) > 0 and ~cw(1) = u:
By di¤erentiating ~cw and ~ch with respect to matching rate , we get
@~ch
@
=   2ru
(2r + )2
 0 (13)
@~cw
@
=   2r(1  )u
[2r + (1  )]2  0 (14)
The above derivatives indicate the amount by which ~cw and ~ch will decrease
if the matching rate will increase by one per cent. Since both derivatives are
negative, an increase in  will rotate (rightward for ~cw and leftward for ~ch) the
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graph of each reservation value around u. The new reservation curves will be
~c
0
w and ~c
0
h as illustrated in gure 2.
[Figure 1 about here]
[Figure 2 about here]
As we can see from gure 2 an increase in matching rate decreases area 1
and increases area 4. In other words, an increase in  increases the range of
cs leading to a type 4 equilibrium (buyers of type i do not trade with sellers
of type j) and decreases the range of cs leading to a type 1 equilibrium (every
meeting generates transactions).
Let assume now that we are initially in type 1 equilibrium trading pattern
and  = 1=2 (i.e., the proportion of h and w type sellers is the same). Moreover,
we assume that ~c   ru
(2r+=2)2
< c  ~c = 4ru
4r+
, where 4ru
4r+
is the value of
reservation cost for  = 1=2 and ru
(2r+=2)2
is the value by which reservation cost
decreases when  increases by one per cent. We set ~c  ru
(2r+=2)2
< c, in order
to ensure that an increase in  by one unit will shift us to equilibrium trading
pattern 4 (look at gure 2). In type 1 equilibrium the absolute di¤erence
between expected lifetime income of sellers is
1 =
V s1h   V s1w  =

u
2r
  
2r
V b1h +
u
2r
  c
2r
  
2r
V b1w   u2r + c2r + 2r V b1w   u2r
+c
2r
+ 
2r
V b1h   u2r + 2rV b1w + u2r   2r V b1w

=
2c2r   c2r
 =) 1 =  j2  1j2r c (15)
For  > 1=2 (i.e., the proportion of h-type buyers is greater than the
proportion of w-type ones) the di¤erence is positive and j2 1j
2r
c = (2 1)
2r
c. If
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 < 1=2 then the di¤erence is negative and j2 1j
2r
c =  (2 1)
2r
c. the greater
value which 1 can take is
2j2 1ju
4r+
(i.e., when c = ~c). Under the assumption
that c > ~c   ru
(2r+=2)2
, an increase in  will lead to type 4 equilibrium. The
absolute di¤erence of sellersincome will be
4 =
V s4h   V s4w  u2r   2r V b4h   u2r + 2rV b4w + u2r   2r V b4w
 (16)
But for  = 1=2 , V b4w = V
b4
h and hence 4 =
2u
2r
  2
2r
V b4h   u2r + 2rV b4h
 =(2 1)(u V b4h )2r . By substituting V b4h , we get that 4 = 24j2 1ju4r+4 . The sub-
script in  indicates that  in 4 is di¤erent from  in 1 (actually 4 > ,
where  is the matching rate in type 1 equilibrium trading pattern). When
 increases then 
4r+
increases as well. Hence 24j2 1ju
4r+4
> 2j2 1ju
4r+
. Since
4 is greater than the greater value that 1 gets, then 4 is always greater
than 1. It can be easily proven that shifts from equilibrium 1 to equilibria
2, 3 or 4 (due to ), lead to the same result. Therefore, we conclude that an
increase in  leads to an increase in income di¤erentials. Hence, factors which
can increase matching rate (such as developments in information technology)
intensify the inequality of sellersincome.
5 Conclusion
Utilizing a simple model with heterogeneous buyers and sellers, where infor-
mational frictions are present, we show that factors reducing their level, such
as the introduction and development of information technology, will aggravate
income inequality among sellers. This paper calls for further research on this
topic either by a theoretical or an empirical perspective.
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Figure 1: Equilibrium trading patterns 
Notes: 
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Figure 2: The impact of an increase in β on reservation values 
Notes: 
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